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Abstract.
This survey provides a comparative overview of code-based signature schemes with respect to security
and performance. Furthermore, we explicitly describe serveral code-based signature schemes with ad-
ditional properties such as identity-based, threshold ring and blind signatures.
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1 Introduction
Secure digital signature are essential components of IT-security solutions, and several schemes, such as the
Digital Signature Algorithm DSA and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ECDSA are already
used in practice. The security of such schemes relies on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem,
either in the multiplicative group of a prime field, or in a subgroup of points of an elliptic curve over
a finite field. These computational assumptions, however, could be broken in a quantum setting by Shor’s
algorithm [38], which was proposed in 1997. Moreover, this algorithm succeeds in polynomial time. Therefore,
new, quantum-attack-resistant signature schemes must be designed. Code-based cryptosystems are promising
alternatives to classical public key cryptography, and they are believed to be secure against quantum attacks.
Their security is based on the conjectured intractability of problems in coding theory, such as the syndrome
decoding problem, which has been proven to be NP-complete by Berlekamp, McEliece, and Van Tilborg [4].
In 1978, McEliece [27] first proposed an asymmetric cryptosystem based on the coding theory, which
derives its security from the general decoding problem. The general idea is to first select a particular (linear)
code for which an efficient decoding algorithm is known, and then to use a trapdoor function to disguise
the code as a general linear code. Though numerous computationally-intensive attacks against the scheme
appear in the literature [5, 19], no efficient attack has been found to date.
The McEliece encryption scheme is not invertible, and therefore it cannot be used for authentication
or for signature schemes; this is indeed why very few signature schemes based on coding theory have been
proposed. This problem remained open until 2001, when Courtois et al. [15] showed how to achieve a code-
based signature scheme whose security is based on the syndrome decoding problem. While this problem is
NP-complete, constructions based on it are still inefficient for large numbers of errors.
A few code-based signature schemes with additional properties, most of them based on the construction
of [15], have recently been published. Lattice-based digital signature schemes for a post-quantum age are
described in [8]. This paper describes code-based solutions.
Contribution and Organisation:
After recalling some basic definitions and notations in Section 2, we discuss the various code-based signature
schemes, starting with CFS, Stern, and KKS in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe all code-based signature
schemes with additional properties, and we conclude in Section 5.
2 Coding theory background
This section recalls some basic definitions and then lists some instances of hard problems in coding theory.
Definition 1. (Linear Code) An (n, k)-code over Fq is a linear subspace C of the linear space F
n
q . Elements
of Fnq are called words, and elements of C are codewords. We call n the length, and k the dimension of C.
Definition 2. (Hamming distance, weigth) The Hamming distance d(x, y) between two words x, y is the
number of positions in which x and y differ. That is, d(x, y) = |{i : xi 6= yi}|, where x = (x1, . . . , xn) and
y = (y1, . . . , yn). Here, we use |S| to denote the number of elements, or cardinality, of a set S. In particular,
d(x,0) is called the Hamming weigth of x, where 0 is the vector containing n 0’s. The minimum distance of
a linear code C is the minimum Hamming distance between any two distinct codewords.
Definition 3. (Generator matrix) A generator matrix of an (n, k)-linear code C is a k × n matrix G
whose rows form a basis for the vector subspace C. We call a code systematic if it can be characterized by
a generator matrix C of the form G = (Ik×k|Ak×(n−k)), where Ik×k is the k × k identity matrix and A, an
k × (n− k) matrix.
Definition 4. (Parity-check matrix) A parity-check matrix of an (n, k)-linear code C is an (n− k) × n
matrix H whose rows form a basis of the orthogonal complement of the vector subspace C, i.e. it holds that,
C = {c ∈ Fnq : Hc
T = 0}.
In what follows, we recall several NP-complete problems in coding theory. Note that NP-completeness
ensures the impossibility to solve a problem in polynomial time in the worse case. In other words, the
property ensures the existence of some hard instances, not the hardness of every instance.
Definition 5. (Binary Syndrome Decoding (SD) problem)
– Input: An r × n matrix H over F2, a target binary vector s ∈ F
r
2, and an integer t > 0.
– Question: Is there a binary word x ∈ Fn2 of weight ≤ t, such that s = Hx
T ?
This problem has been proved to be NP-Complete by Berlekamp, McEliece, and van Tilborg [4]. In 1994,
Barg [2] extended this result of Berlekamp, McEliece, and van Tilborg over Fq by proving that the following
problem, called q-ary Syndrome Decoding (q-SD) problem, is NP-complete.
Definition 6. (q-ary Syndrome Decoding (q-SD) problem)
– Input: An r × n matrix H over Fq, a target vector s ∈ F
r
q, and an integer t > 0.
– Question: Is there a word x ∈ Fnq of weight ≤ t, such that s = Hx
T ?
To end this section, we state the Goppa Code Distinguishing (GD) problem :
Definition 7. (Goppa Code Distinguishing (GD) problem)
– Input: An (n− k)× n binary matrix H.
– Question: Is H a parity check matrix of a (n, k)-Goppa code or of a random (n, k)-code ?
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3 Code based signature schemes
During the last twenty years several (linear)-code-based signature schemes were proposed; the first attempts
were due to Xinmei Wang [42], followed by Harn and Wang [23] and Alabbadi and Wicker [1]. Unfortunately,
the security of these constructions cannot be reduced to the hardness of the problems above, and the schemes
were proved insecure [42, 23].
Several signature schemes based on these problems were subsequently designed; we outline these below.
3.1 Courtois et. al’s scheme
Unlike RSA, one of the major obstacles to the widespread use of the McEliece or the Niederreiter cryptosys-
tems was the one-to-one nature of the encryption algorithms, i.e, a random word x ∈ Fn2 that is encrypted
to, say, y is not necessary decodable. That is, the Hamming distance between y and any codeword is greater
than the error capability of the code. This is due the fact that the cardinality of decodable words is very
small. To fix this problem, Courtois, Finiasz, and Sendrier [15] (CFS) suggested a method, named complete
decoding, which increases the correction capability in order to find the nearest word to a given codeword
with high probability.
The CFS signature scheme uses Goppa codes that are subfield subcodes of particular alternant code [26].
For given integers m and t, binary Goppa codes are of length n = 2m , of dimension k = n −mt, and are
t-correcting. The basic idea of the CFS signature scheme is to find parameters n, k, and t such that the
Niederreiter scheme described in Algorithm 1 is practically invertible.
Algorithm 1 The Niederreiter PKC
Key Generation:
- Consider an (n, k)-code C over Fq having a decoding algorithm γ.
- Construct an (n− k)× n parity check matrix H˜ of C.
- Choose randomly an (n− k)× (n− k) invertible matrix Q over Fq.
- Choose randomly an n× n permutation matrix P over Fq.
- The public key: H = QH˜P
- The private key: (P, H˜,Q, γ)
Encryption: To encrypt a message x ∈ Fnq of weight t
- Compute y = HxT .
Decryption: To decrypt a cipher y ∈ Fn−kq s.t. y = Hx
T
- Compute Q−1y (= H˜PxT )
- Find PxT from Q−1y by applying γ
- Find x by applying P−1 to PxT .
A CFS signature on a message M – see algorithm 2 – is generated by hashing M to a syndrome and
then trying to decode it. However, for a t-error correcting Goppa code of length n = 2m, only about 1/t! of
the syndromes are decodable. Thus, a counter is appended to M , and the signer updates the counter until
the hash value is decodable. The signature consists of both the syndrome’s weight t error pattern and the
counter value.
Security. The authors of [19] show an attack against the CFS scheme due to Daniel Bleichenbacher.
This attack is based on an ’unbalanced’ Generalized Birthday Attack. Therefore, the values of m and t used
by CFS have been changed. For a security of more than 280 binary operations, [19] proposed new parameters
of: m = 21 and t = 10; m = 19 and t = 11; or m = 15 and t = 12. Furthermore, the authors of modified
CFS (mCFS) [16] give a security proof in the random oracle model, where the counter is randomly chosen
in {1, . . . , 2n−k}.
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Algorithm 2 The CFS signature
Key Generation:
- Pick random parity check matrix H˜ of (n, k)-binary,
t error-correcting Goppa code with decoding algorithm γ.
- Construct binary matrices Q, H and P as in Algorithm 1.
Signature: To sign a message M
(1) i← i+ 1
(2) x′ = γ
(
Q−1h(h(m)‖i)
)
(3) if no x′ was found go to 1
- Output (i, x′P )
Verification:
- Compute s′ = Hx′
T
and s = h(h(m)‖i).
- The signature is valid if s and s′ are equals.
3.2 Stern’s identification scheme
In 1993, Stern [40] presented a 3-pass zero-knowledge protocol which is closely related to the Niederreiter
cryptosystem. This protocol aims at enabling a prover P to identify himself to a verifier V . Its principle is
as follows: Let H be an (n−k)×n binary matrix common to all users, where n and k are integers s.t. k ≤ n.
Each prover P has an n-bit secret key s of weight t and an (n− k)-bit public identifier y satisfying y = HsT .
When P needs to authenticate to V as the owner of y, then P and V run the Algorithm 3. It was shown in
[40] that the probability that an adversary successfully impersonates an honest prover is 2/3.
Algorithm 3 Stern’s Scheme
Key Generation : Given binary random (k, n)-code with parity-check matrix H , secure hash function h.
- Private key: s ∈ Fn2 , such that w(s) = t
- Public key: y ∈ Fn−k2 , such that Hs
T = y
Commitments:
- P chooses randomly u from Fn2 and σ permutation over {1, . . . , n}
- P computes the commitments c1, c2, and c3 as follows:
c1 = h(
(
σ,HuT
)
), c2 = h(σ(u)), c3 = h(σ (u⊕ s))
- P sends c1, c2, and c3 to V
Challenge: V randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1, 2} and sends it to P
Response:
- If b = 0: P sends u and σ to V
- If b = 1: P sends u⊕ s and σ to V
- If b = 2: P sends σ(u) and σ(s) to V
Verification :
- If b = 0: V checks if c1 and c2 were honestly computed
- If b = 1: V checks if c1 and c3 were honestly computed
- If b = 2: V checks if c2 and c3 were honestly computed and w(σ(s)) = t
In 1995, Véron [41] proposed a dual version of Stern’s scheme, which, unlike other schemes based on the
SD problem, uses a generator matrix of a random binary linear code. This allows, among other things, for
an improved transmission rate.
It is possible to convert Stern’s construction into a signature algorithm using the Fiat-Shamir method
[18]: the verifier-queries are replaced by values suitably derived from the commitments and the message to
be signed. In this case, however, the signature is large, of roughly 120 Kbits.
A variation of the Stern construction using double circulant codes is proposed in [20]. The circulant
structure of the public parity-check matrix allows for an easy generation of the whole binary matrix with
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very little memory storage. They propose a scheme with a public key of 347 bits and a private key of 694
bits. We can also imagine a construction based on quasi-dyadic codes as proposed in [29].
A secure implementation [11] of Stern’s scheme uses quasi-circulant codes. This scheme also inherits
Stern’s natural resistance to leakage attacks such as SPA and DPA.
3.3 Kabatianskii et al.’s scheme
Kabatianskii, Krouk, and Smeets (KKS) [24] proposed a signature scheme based on arbitrary linear error-
correcting codes. Actually, they proposed three versions (using different linear codes) presented in the sequel
and all have one point in common: the signature is a codeword of a linear code. We give a full description of
the KKS scheme which is illustrated in Algorithm 4.
First consider a code C defined by a random parity-check matrix H ; let d be a good estimate of its
minimum distance. Next, consider a linear code U of length n′ ≤ n and dimension k defined by a generator
matrix G = [gi,j]. We suppose that there exist integers t1 and t2 s.t. t1 ≤ w(u) ≤ t2 for any non-zero
codeword u ∈ U .
Let J be a subset of {1, . . . , n} of cardinality n′, H(J) be the sub matrix of H consisting of the columns
hi where i ∈ J , and define an r× n
′ matrix F
def
= H(J)GT . Define a k× n matrix G∗ = [g∗i,j ] with g
∗
i,j = gi,j
if j ∈ J and g∗i,j = 0 otherwise. The KKS-signature is σ = mG
∗ for any m ∈ Fkq . The main difference
with Niederreiter signature occurs in the verification step where the receiver checks that: t1 ≤ w(σ) ≤
t2 and F ·m
T = H · σT .
Algorithm 4 The KKS Signature
Key Generation:
- Pick random (n, n− r) code C, then choose secretly and randomly:
(1) Generator matrix G of an (n′, k) code U with n′ < n and such that ∀v ∈ V, v 6= 0 t1 ≤ w(v) ≤ t2
(2) Subset J of {1, · · · , n} of cardinality n′
- Form the submatrix H(J) consisting of the columns hi of a parity check matrix H of C where i ∈ J
- Define the matrix F as F = H(J)GT .
Private key: (J,G)
Public Key: (F,H, t1, t2)
Signature: To sign a message m
(1) Calculate σ∗ = m ·G
(2) Produce σ such that
σi =
{
σ∗i if i ∈ J
0 if j /∈ J
Verification: Given (σ,m) test whether the following holds:
(1) H · σT = F ·m
(2) t1 ≤ w(σ) ≤ t2
Security. The authors of [24] proposed four KKS-signature schemes: KKS-1, KKS-2, KKS-3, KKS-4,
which are claimed to be as secure as the Niederreiter scheme if the public parameters do not provide any
information. Unfortunately, in [12] the author showed that a generated KKS-signature discloses a lot of
information about the secret set J , and so an adversary can find the secret matrix G with a very high
probability. Indeed, an attacker needs about 277 binary operations and at most 20 signatures to break the
original KKS-3 scheme. For this reason, the authors of [12] suggest new parameters for a security of 40
signatures, as follows: n = 2000, k = 160, n′ = 1000, r = 1100, t1 = 90 and t2 = 110.
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4 Code based Signature schemes with additional properties
There exist just a few code-based signature schemes with special properties (SP) up to date, namely blind,
(threshold) ring signatures, and identity-based signature schemes. By comparison, classical cryptography
includes more than sixty classes of signature schemes, some with special properties such as group- or proxy
signature. This variety reflects the wide range of application scenarios.
In recent years, existing signature schemes were combined with specific protocols in order to achieve
enhanced code-based constructions with additional features, such as anonymity. The properties of the un-
derlying basic scheme could be e.g. authentication and non-repudiation. In what follows, we give a state of
the art of such signature schemes.
4.1 Ring Signatures
The concept of ring signatures was firstly introduced in 2001 by Rivest, Rivest, and Tauman [33]. Such
signature schemes allow signers of a document to remain anonymous in a group of users, called a ring.
As opposed to group signatures, no group manager, group setup procedure, cooperation, and revocation
mechanisms are needed in ring signatures: the signer specifies an arbitrary ring and then signs on its behalf
without permission or assistance from other users. To generate a valid signature, users need their private
keys and some other members’ public keys.
Zheng et al.’s scheme In [44], Zheng, Li, and Chen (ZLC) proposed the first code-based ring signature,
which extends the CFS signature scheme and is based on the syndrome decoding problem. To describe the
ZLC signature, we use the following notations. Let N and l be the number of potential signers and of signers
participating in the signature-generating, respectively. Denote by Si and Sr a potential signer and the ring
signer, respectively. Let M be a message and h, a hash function of range Fn−k2 . Write the concatenation of
s1 and s2 as (s1|s2); let u
R
←− U indicate that u is randomly selected from a set U . The ring signer and all
other potential signers run Algorithm 5 to generate a ring signature on M .
Algorithm 5 The ZLC ring Signature
Key Generation: Potential signers Si generate their private/public keys as in the CFS algorithm (Alg.2):
- The public key: Hi = QiH˜iPi
- The private key: (Pi, H˜i, Qi, γi)
Signature: To sign message M
(1) Initialization: For j = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
- x¯j
R
←− {0, 1}n−k
- Set xr+1,j = h(N |h(M)|x¯j)
(2) Generating ring sequences: For j = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
- zi,j
R
←− {0, 1}n s.t. w(zi,j) = t
- Set xi+1,j = h
(
N |h(M)|Hi · z
T
i,j ⊕ xi,j
)
(3) Find an j0 s.t. xr,j0 ⊕ x¯j0 is decodable
(4) Apply the decoding algorithm to get an zr,j0 s.t. Hr · z
T
r,j0
= xr,j0 ⊕ x¯j0
(5) Compute the index Izi,j0 corresponding to zi,j0
(6) The ring signatutre: (x0,j0 , Iz1,j0 , · · · , Izl−1,j0 )
Verification: Given (x0,j0 , Iz1,j0 , · · · , Iz(l−1),j0 )
(1) Derive zi,j0 from Izi,j0 for each i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , l − 1}
(2) Compute xi+1,j0 = h
(
N |h(M)|Hi · z
T
i,j0
⊕ xi,j0
)
for i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , l − 1}
(3) Accept if xl,j0 = x0,j0 and reject otherwise.
Security and Efficiency. The ZLC scheme is based on CFS signatures, whose security relies on two
assumptions: It is hard to solve an instance of the SD problem, and it is hard to distinguish a Goppa code
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from a random one – the GD problem. The authors of [44] also showed that the ZLC construction provides
unforgeability and anonymity. Indeed, the probability of forging a signature is 12n , and any adversary outside
the ring cannot guess the signer’s identity due to the uniform distribution of xi,j0 . This scheme is as efficient
as the CFS signature, and verification takes tl column operations1 and l + 1 hash computations; the total
signature length is close to (n−k)+log2(
(
n
t
)
)l bits, where log2(
(
n
t
)
) is the number of bits required to address
a word of length n and weight t. For instance, for m = 16 and t = 9, the signature length is about 144+126l
bits.
4.2 Threshold Ring Signatures
Since its introduction in 2001, a lot of effort has gone into modifying and extending the ring signature scheme
[33]. One such extension is the BSS threshold ring signature scheme first proposed by Bresson, Stern and
Szydlo [7] in 2002. In threshold ring signature schemes, the secret signing key is distributed amongst N
members; at least l of these members are required to generate a valid signature. More precisely, in an (l, N)
threshold signature scheme, any set of l members can generate an l-out-of-N signature on behalf of the whole
group, without revealing their identity. This type of construction decreases the cost of signing, as it does not
require the participation of all N members.
Several threshold ring signatures have followed [7]. For example, Wong et al. [43] proposed the tandem
construction, a threshold signature scheme using a secure multiparty trapdoor transformation. The threshold
ring signature in [25] uses both RSA- and DL-based public keys at the same time and introduces the notion
of separability: all signers can select their own keys independently, with distinguishable parameter domains.
These signatures, however, and many others, are factoring- ECC-, or pairing-based. Only two coding-based
proposals are known, however, up to date. In the following, we outline these proposals.
Aguilar et al.’s scheme (ACG) The first non-generic code-based threshold ring signature scheme is
introduced in [28]; it generalizes Stern’s identification protocol into a threshold ring signature scheme, using
the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [18]. Algorithm 6 explains how Aguilar et al.’s construction works. We denote by
N the number of signers (provers) in the ring, and let l with (l ≤ N) stand for the number of first signers.
A leader SL amongst them gives to the ring members their public keys.
Security and Efficiency. Aguilar et al.’s identification scheme is a zero-knowledge protocol with a
cheating probability of 2/3 as in Stern’s scheme. Its security relies on the hardness of the SD problem:
finding a vector s ∈ FnN2 of weight tl and a null syndrome w.r.t. H such that each block (out of N) of
length is of weight t or 0. The signing complexity and signature length are N times those of Stern’s signature
scheme: a complexity of about 140n2N independently of l, and a length of about 20kB × N . In order to
reduce the public key size, [28] suggested the use of double-circulant matrices, requiring nN/2, rather than
n2N/2 storage bits. For double-circulant matrices, [20] proposes parameters n = 347 and t = 76 for an 83-bit
security level, rather than n = 634, t = 69, and a rate 1/2, as in an 80-bit secure Stern’s scheme.
Dallot et al.’s scheme A second code-based threshold ring signature has been proposed by Dallot and
Vergnaud (DV) in [17], combining the generic construction of Bresson et al. [7] with the CFS signature
scheme. The DV construction requires the following: an (n, k) t-error-correcting binary Goppa code with
n = 2m and k = n−mt, where m a positive integer. We denote by N and l the number of ring users and the
number of signers respectively. Let h be a public collision-resistant hash function of range {0, 1}mt, f(·), a
trapdoor one-way function : {0, 1}
a
→ {0, 1}
mt
, and (Ek,i), a family of random permutations that encrypts
b-bit messages with a0-bit keys and an additional parameter i ∈ [1, N ]. We again denote concatenation as
(s|s′) and random selection by x
R
←− S.
For simplicity, we index the signers as 1, · · · , l. In addition, each ring member i is associated with a
secret/public key pair as in the CFS construction, i.e. the public key is Hi = QiH˜iPi and the secret key is
(Pi, H˜i, Qi, γi). Dallot et al.’s procedure is presented in Algorithm 7.
1 One column operation is one access to a table plus one operation like a comparison or an addition
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Algorithm 6 The ACG Identification Scheme
Key Generation: Each potential signer Si has:
- The public key: the (n− k)× n binary matrix Hi
- The private key: n-bit word si the weight t s.t. His
T
i = 0,
- The ring public key : (n− k)N × nN binary matrix H defined by:
H =


H1 0 · · · 0
0 H2 0 0
...
. . . Hi 0
0 0 · · · HN


Commitment:
- Each prover Si (among l signers) chooses randomly zi ∈ F
n
2 and a permutation σi of {1, · · · , n}
- Each prover Si sends to SL three commitments c1,i, c2,i and c3,i given by:
c1,i = h(
(
σi,Hiz
T
i
)
), c2,i = h(σi(zi)) and c3,i = h(σi (zi ⊕ si))
- SL generates the N − l missing commitments for the N − l non-signers by fixing all remaining si at 0.
- SL chooses randomly a constant n-block permutation Π on N blocks
- SL computes the master commitments C1, C2 and C3 using c1,i, c2,i and c3,i by:
C1 = h(Π (c1,1, · · · , c1,N )), C2 = h(Π (c2,1, · · · , c2,N )), C3 = h(Π (c3,1, · · · , c3,N ))
- SL sends C1, C2 and C3 to the verifier V .
Challenge:
-V sends a challenge b ∈ {0, 1, 2} to SL which forwards this challenge to l signers.
Response:
- Perform the challenge step of the Stern’s protocol between each prover Si and SL
- SL simulates the missing N − l Stern’s protocol with si = 0 for all l + 1 ≤ i ≤ N
- SL gathers all answers to create the global response for V as follows:
* If b = 0: SL sets z = (z1 · · · , zN), Ω = Π ◦ (σ1, · · · , σN ) and reveals z and Ω
* If b = 1: SL constructs x = (y1 ⊕ s1, · · · , yN ⊕ sN) and reveals x and Ω
* If b = 2: SL constructs Π(y1, · · · , yN) and reveals Ω(s1, · · · , sN )
Verification:
- If b = 0: V checks that Ω(s) is a n-block permutation and that C1, C2 were honestly computed.
- If b = 1: V checks that Ω(s) is a n-block permutation and that C1, C3 were honestly computed.
- If b = 2: V checks that:
* C2, C3 were honestly computed
* w(Ω(s)) = lt
* each of block of Ω(s) of length n has weigth t or 0.
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Algorithm 7 The DV threshold ring signature scheme
Key Generation : Each signer in the ring has to:
- choose an (n, k)-code Ci over F2 having a decoding algorithm γi correcting up to t errors.
- construct an n× (n− k) parity check matrix H˜i of Ci.
- choose randomly an (n− k)× (n− k) invertible matrix Qi over F2.
- choose randomly an n× n permutation matrix Pi over F2.
- The public key: Hi = QiH˜iPi
- The private key: (Pi, H˜i, Qi, γi)
Signature: To generate a signature on a message M :
- compute the symmetric key for E: k = h(M).
- compute value at origin: v0 = h(Hi, · · · ,HN) .
- choose random seeds: For each i = l + 1, · · · , N do
(1) xi
R
←− {x ∈ Fn2 s.t. w(x) ≤ t}
(2) ri
R
←− {1 · · · , 2tm}
(3) yi ←− Hix
T
i + h(M |ri)
- compute a sharing polynomial: Find a polynomial f over F2tm s.t.
- deg(f) = N − l
- f(0) = v0
- f(i) = Ek,i(yi) ∀ l + 1 ≤ i ≤ N
- For each i = 1, · · · , l do
- xi ←− ∅
- While xi = ∅ do
(1) ri
R
←− {1 · · · , 2tm}
(2) zi ←− γi(Q
−1
i · (Ek,i(f(i)) + h(M |ri)))
(3) if zi 6= ∅ then xi ←− ziP
−1
i
- The signature: σ = (N,x1, . . . , xN , r1, . . . , rn, f)
Verification: Given (N,x1, . . . , xn, r1, . . . , rn, f) any user can verify the signature by:
- Recovering the symmetric key: k = h(M)
- Recovering (yi): yi = Hix
T
i + h(M |ri)
- checking the equations:
(1) f(0)
?
= h(H1, · · · ,HN )
(2) f(i)
?
= Ek,i(yi) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N
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Security and Efficiency. The DV construction is a provably secure threshold ring signature satisfying
three properties: consistency, anonymity, and unforgeability [17]. Unforgeability is proved based on two
coding theory problems. One is the well known NP-complete [4] Bounded Distance Decoding problem
(GBDP) which is a variant of the SD problem with the constraint that the number of errors is up to
(n − k/ log2(n)) as in the mCFS signature scheme. The second is the GCD problem: distinguishing a
randomly sampled Goppa code from a random linear code (with the same parameters); this problem is
widely considered as difficult [35]. The complete security proof of the DV scheme is in [17].
For a ring with N members, the set of public keys (Hi) are stored in n(n− k)N bits. To produce a valid
signature, the signer has to perform the following calculations: computing N − l syndromes, N polynomial
evaluations that can be performed in 2N(N − l) binary operations using Horner’s rule and l(t!) decodings of
Goppa codes, each consisting of: computing a syndrome (in about t2m2/2 binary operations), computing a
localisator polynomial (6t2m binary operations) and computing its roots ( 2t2m2 binary operations). Thus,
the total cost for generating a signature would be (N − l)t2m2/2 + 2N(N − l) + l(t!)(3/2 + 6/m) binary
operations.
Signature verification requires (N + 1) polynomial evaluations N syndrome-computations, resulting in
2(N+1)(N−l)+Nt2m2/2 binary operations. The signature consists of: the numberN of ring-users, which are
stored in log2(N) bits, N random vectors xi of weight up to t which can be indexed with a ⌊log2
∑t
i=1
(
2m
i
)
⌋
bit counter, N random vectors ri in {0, . . . , 2
mt − 1} requiring at most mt bits and a polynomial of degree
N − l which needs (N − l + 1)mt bits. The signature size is thus about N
(
⌊log2
∑t
i=1
(
2m
i
)
⌋+ 2mt
)
+
log2(N)− (l − 1)mt bits.
4.3 Blind signatures
Blind signatures were first introduced by Chaum [13] for applications such as e-Voting or electronic payment
systems, which require anonymity. The main goal of Chaum’s scheme is to ensure Blindness (i.e., the signed
message is disguised – blinded – before signing) and Untraceability (i.e., the signer cannot trace the signed
message after the sender has revealed the signature publicly).
Several blind signature schemes followed Chaum’s proposal. In 1988, the authors of [14] showed a new
signature scheme for electronic payment systems. Later, the authors of [39] introduced fair blind signature
schemes. In 1992, another blind signature scheme based on factoring and discrete logarithm-based identifi-
cation schemes [30] have been developed. Based on Schnorr’s [34] and Guillou-Quisquater’s [22] protocols,
provably secure blind signature schemes were presented in [32]. As far as we know, there exists only a single
code-based blind signature scheme, namely Overbeck’s construction [31].
Overbeck’s scheme The general idea behind Overbeck’s protocol is, instead of blinding the message, to
use permuting kernels in order to blind the signer’s public key from a public key of a code. A blind signature
is thus generated by the owner of a valid secret key, with the blinded public key. During verification, the
blinder gives a static zero-knowledge proof showing that the private and public keys are paired. This proof is
based on the Permuted Kernels Problem (PKP) which can be formulated as follows: Given a random (n, k)
code and a random permuted subcode of dimension L < k, find the permutation. This problem is known to
be NP-hard in the general case [37].
For simplicity, we denote a code by its generator matrix. Let h be a hash function, r be a random seed,
and w be a positive integer. Denote by PKP-proof(A,B) the static PKP-Proof that code A is an isometric
subcode of code B, s.t. dim(A) ≤ dim(B). The notation dim(C) stands for the dimension of the code C.
A slightly modified version of Overbeck’s blind signature scheme is depicted in Algorithm 8.
Security and Efficiency. Overbeck assessed the efficiency of his scheme by applying it to the CFS
construction. For a (2m, 2m −mt) binary Goppa code, the complexity of this scheme is as follows: To store
a public parity check matrix key H 2m × mt bits are needed. The blind matrix Hb is a 2
m × (mt − L)
binary matrix. To generate a single signature, the Blinding algorithm is run
(
2mt/
(
2m
t
))
times, each time
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Algorithm 8 Overbeck’s blind signature
Key Generation:
- choose an (n, k)-code C over F2 having a decoding algorithm γ correcting up to t errors.
- construct an (n− k)× n parity check matrix H˜ of C.
- choose randomly an (n− k)× (n− k) invertible matrix Q over Fq.
- choose randomly an n× n permutation matrix P over Fq.
- The public key: H = QH˜P
- The private key: (P, H˜,Q, γ)
Blinding: The user has to:
- generate a random p× n public matrix R0 over Fq
- generate a random L× p matrix K of full rank over Fq
- set R = KR0
- generate a n× n permutation matrix Π
- create the blind generator matrix Gb as follows: Gb = [
G
R
]Π
- derive from Gb the blind check matrix Hb
- solve Hbx
T = h(M |Hb) in x
- output s = H(xΠ−1) (the blind syndrome) and u = (r,Π,Hb) (the unblinding information)
Unblinding: Given M , s and a correct signature σ of H :
- Check if that: w(σ) = t and HσT = s. If not output failure.
- Generate a PKP-Proof(Hb,H0) with H0 = [
H
R0
]
- Output the blind signature σb = (r,Hb, σpi,PKP-Proof(Hb, H0))
Verification: Given r, M , and σb = (r,Hb, σpi,PKP-Proof(Hb,HR)), where HR is a parity-check matrix of the
code generated by R, verify σb by:
- Generate the matrix R0 from r
- Find some vector τ satisfying HτT = h(M |Hb)
- Verify w(σΠ) < t and (τ − σΠ) ∈ Hb
- Check PKP-Proof(Hb,HR)
requiring m3t2 binary operations for the signer and m3t3 for the blinder. Thus, the total signing complexity
is about
(
2mt/
(
2m
t
))
(m3t2+m3t3) binary operations per signature. The blind signature size mainly depends
on PKP-Proof(Hb, H0) requiring the storage of the generator matrix Gb of size ((k + L) × n) bits in each
round.
The author of [31] does not explicitly prove the proposed construction, but he claims that the scheme is
provably secure based on the hardness of some instances of the PKP and SD problems.
4.4 Identity-based Signatures
Identity-based cryptography was proposed by Shamir in 1984 [36] so as to simplify PKI requirements. An
identity is associated with data such as an e-mail or IP-address instead of a public key; the secret key is
issued by a trusted Key Generation Center (KGC) thanks to a master secret that only the KGC knows.
Some PKI and certificate costs can now be avoided. However, identity-based cryptography suffers from a
major drawback: the KGC must be trusted completely. A solution to this problem, also known as the key
escrow problem, is to employ multiple PKGs that jointly produce the master secret key (see [6]).
Identity-based cryptography has led to the development, in 1984, of identity-based signature (IBS)
schemes. One of the most interesting contributions to this subject is the framework of [3], for which a
large family of IBS are proved secure. This work was later extended in [21], which implied the existence of
generic IBS constructions with various additional properties that are provably secure in the standard model.
Cayrel et al.’s identification scheme The first coding-based IBS appeared in [10] is due to Cayrel,
Gaborit and Girault (CGG). The main idea of this scheme is to combine the mCFS scheme with a slightly
modified Stern scheme to obtain an IBS scheme whose security relies on the syndrome decoding problem.
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The mCFS scheme is used to solve an instance of the SD problem given a hash value of an identity in the
first step, while Stern’s protocol is used for identification in the following step.
Consider a linear (n, k)-code over F2 with a disguised parity-check matrix H defined by H = QH˜S with
H˜ the original parity-check matrix, Q invertible, and S a permutation matrix. The matrix H is public, while
Q and S are kept secret by a trusted Key Generation Center (KGC). Denote by h a hash function with
outputs in {0, 1}n−k. In addition, let y be the identity associated to the prover wishing to authenticate to a
verifier. The Cayrel et al. identification scheme works as Stern’s protocol, with a few variations.
Security and Efficiency. Cayrel et al.’s identification scheme (CFS-Stern IBS) is provably secure against
passive (i.e., eavesdropping only) impersonation attacks [10], based on the hardness of the SD and GD
problems. The security and the performance of the proposed identification scheme mainly depends on the
difficulty of finding a couple {s, j} without the descriptionH . At the same time, an attacker needs to minimize
the number of attempts used to find j, so as to be able to find s with minimal cost.
Algorithm 9 The CGG Identity-based scheme
Key Deliverance:
- The prover sends its identity y to KGC
- TCA runs the CFS algorithm (Alg. 2) on y to get {s, j} s.t. h(h(y)|j) = HsT with w(s) ≤ t
- The Public key: h(h(y)|j)
- The Private key: {s, j}
Identification: Run the Stern’s protocol as follows:
- Commitments:
- P chooses randomly u from Fn2 and σ permutation over {1, . . . , n}
- P computes the commitments c1, c2 and c3 as follows:
c1 = h
(
σ,HuT
)
, c2 = h(σ(u)), c3 = h(σ (u⊕ s))
- P sends c1, c2 and c3 and j to V
- Challenge: V choose randomdy b ∈ {0, 1, 2} and sends it to P
- Response:
- If b = 0: P sends u and σ to V
- If b = 1: P sends u⊕ s and σ to V
- If b = 2: P sends σ(u) and σ(s) to V
- Verification :
- If b = 0: V checks if c1 and c2 were honestly computed
- If b = 1: V checks if c1 and c3 were honestly computed
- If b = 2: V checks if c3 and c3 were honestly computed and w(s) = t
4.5 Summary
In Table 1 we summarize the complexity of the code-based proposals with special properties by using the
following notations: t is the correction capability of the code, n denotes the code length which equals 2m in
the case of Goppa codes, k indicates the code dimension, N is number of users in the ring, l is number of
involved signers in the ring , L is dimension of the subcode introduced in [31] and ri is number of rounds for
i = 1, 2.
Based on these notations, we define the two following quantities:
– A(m, t,N, l) = N
(
⌊log2
∑t
i=1
(
2m
i
)
⌋+ 2mt
)
+ log2(N)− (l − 1)mt
– B(m, t,N, l) = (N − l)t2m2/2 + 2N(N − l) + l(t!)(3/2 + 6/m).
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Table 1. Code-based signatures with special properties with parameters (m, t,N, l, L, r1, r2) =
(15, 12, 100, 50, 40, 58, 80)
Schemes Pk size in bits Sign. size in bits Sign. cost in bops
Identity Based Signatures
PGGG [9] 2mtm (≈ 0.7 MB) 2m × r1 (≈ 1.1 MB) t!t
2m2(1/2 + 2 + 6/m)(≈ 245)
Ring Signatures
ZLC [44] 2mtm (≈ 0.7 MB) tm+ log2(
(
2
m
t
)
)l (≈ 0.95 kB) t!t2m2 (≈ 243.8)
Threshold(ring) Signatures
ACG [28] n2N/2 (≈ 2.41 MB) 20000 ×N (≈ 0.24 MB) 140n2N (≈ 232.3)
DV [17] 2mtmN (≈ 70 MB) A(m, t,N, l) (≈ 5.2 kB) B(m, t,N, l) (≈ 235.4)
Blind Signatures
Overbeck[31] 2mtm (≈ 0.7 MB) ((2m − tm+ L)2m)× r2 (≈ 9.95 GB)
(
2mt/
(
2
m
t
))
(m3t2 +m3t3) (≈ 2190)
5 Conclusion
Several code-based signature schemes already exist, exhibiting features such as small public key size (Stern
[40]), short signature size (CFS [15]), or a good balance of public key and signature size at the expense of
security (KKS [24]). By combining such schemes, additional constructions such as identity-based, threshold
ring, or blind signatures can be obtained. However these schemes also inherit the disadvantages of the
underlying protocols. We strongly encourage the code-based research community to actively investigate
future possibilities for post-quantum signature schemes, such as multi-signatures, group signatures, or linkable
signatures.
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